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Marx 1845 or the Fateful Rejection of Anschauung 
 
 
Abstract 
 
One of Karl Marx’s strongest condemnation is that of Ludwig Feuerbach’s intuitive-
contemplative materialism in his Theses of 1845. This condemnation famously leads him to 
an understanding of human activity as purely objective and of “revolution” as praxis, that is, 
as a “practical-critical” activity exclusively based on reason and reason alone. The question 
that is rarely asked about this condemnation is this: what is lost in this abandonment of the 
intuitive-contemplative on the way to historical materialism? The aim behind this question is 
purely speculative. It does not intend to provide yet again a historical reading of this famous 
turning point in Marx’s move away from Feuerbach. It simply intends to see whether 
something could be gained instead from revisiting Feuerbach’s understanding of the intuitive-
contemplative and whether this could allow us to move beyond the 21st Century deadlock of 
Marx’s “rational praxis.” In terms of reading, the essay will concentrate not only on Marx’s 
Theses and the “works of the break,” but also on key aspects of Feuerbach’s understanding of 
intuition-contemplation, as well as contemporary readings of this major turning point in 
history, especially those in the French Marxist tradition such as Bloch, Henry, Althusser, 
Macherey, and of course, Balibar.  
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Introduction: The Condemnation 
 
One of Karl Marx’s strongest condemnation is that of Ludwig Feuerbach’s intuitive-
contemplative materialism in his famous Theses of 1845. The disapproval is crystal clear: 
“[Feuerbach] does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary,’ of ‘practical-critical,’ 
activity.” (Marx and Engels 2008, 69). Engels follows suit in The German Ideology with a 
much more acerbic vilification of the famously recluse philosopher. He writes: “The entire 
philosophy of Feuerbach amounts to… a passive adoration of nature and enraptured kneeling 
down before its splendour and omnipotence.” (Marx and Engels 1976, 11). But this isn’t all, 
Engels sees in Feuerbach one of the many “sheep, who take themselves (and are taken) for 
wolves… their bleating merely imitates, in a philosophical form, the concepts of the German 
middle class…” (Marx and Engels 1976, 23). By the time Marx and Engels elaborate their 
own interpretation of materialism, Feuerbach is basically a philosopher who “achieved 
nothing positive beyond a turgid religion of love and a meagre, impotent morality.” (Marx 
and Engels 2008, 247). This damaging condemnation of Feuerbach has persisted ever since. 
As Zawar Hanfi, who introduces the most well-known edited collection of texts by Feuerbach 
in English summarises: “Marx drifts away from Feuerbach… leading [him] to the elaboration 
of a concept of man that… transcends the scope of the contemplatively limited anthropology 
of Feuerbach.” (Feuerbach 2012). 1845 thus sounds the death toll for Feuerbach and his 
works.  
 
This condemnation is often interpreted as a major turning point in the development of Marx’s 
ideas. For example, Louis Althusser, as is well known, calls Marx and Engels writings of the 
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period, “the Works of the Break.” (Althusser 2005, xxxiii). Another major commentator on 
these early works, Etienne Balibar, also confirms the importance of this hinge in the 
philosophical thought of Marx and Engels. He writes: “the Theses are symptomatic of the 
theoretical revolution (or “epistemological break”) through which Marx would have dropped 
an essentially Feuerbachian ‘humanist’ understanding of communism to adopt a scientific 
(non ideological) problematic of social relations and class struggles as the motor of history.” 
(Balibar 2012). Feuerbach’s condemnation thus signals a new departure for Marx away from 
a seemingly “bourgeois” contemplation of nature towards a scientific materialism often 
called “dialectical.” 
 
While much has been written about this famous turning point, little has been said of the one 
key element of this condemnation: As the quotes above show, the condemnation focuses not 
just on a blanket repudiation of all previous “humanist” and “bourgeois” materialisms, 
including that of Feuerbach, but much more specifically on a rejection of an approach to 
materialism that is considered “intuitive-contemplative,” in German, Anschauung. Marx’s 
first Theses on Feuerbach is here indicative of this specific rejection. He writes:  
 
“The chief defect of all hitherto-existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that 
the thing, reality, [and] sensuousness (der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit) are 
conceived only in the form of the object (Objekts) or of intuition/contemplation 
(Anschauung), but not as human sensuous activity, practice (Praxis), not subjectively.” 
(Marx and Engels 2008, 69). 
 
Marx’s point is clear: the three key elements of materialism, namely, “the thing, reality, and 
sensuousness” can be apprehended neither as an object of reason nor intuitively-
contemplatively (Anschauung). It must be approached instead as activity, as praxis. Marx 
confirms this again in the fifth thesis, when he writes:  
 
“Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants intuition-contemplation (will die 
Anschauung); but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous 
activity.” (Marx and Engels 2008, 70). 
 
Marx’s vocabulary is unequivocal: Feuerbach “wants” intuition-contemplation (Anschauung) 
because on the one hand, abstraction has failed him and on the other, he is incapable of 
conceiving materialism as praxis. In other words, Feuerbach “needs…” (will die…) the 
grounding that intuition-contemplation (…Anschauung) provides without realising that it is 
praxis that grounds materialism.1 The 1845 condemnation of Feuerbach’s work thus hinges 
on this “bourgeois” blindness to see human activity as the only basis for materialism.  
 
In a typically less nuanced manner, Engels also confirms the rejection of intuitive-
contemplative approaches to materialism when he writes: “Feuerbach’s ‘conception’ of the 
sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to 
mere feeling…” (Marx and Engels 1976, 39). The aim of both Marx and Engels’ critique of 
Feuerbach’s intuitive-contemplative approach is to highlight that materialism can only be 
understood as the product of industry and not as the outcome of an unproductive (and thereby 
simply intuitive-contemplative) apprehension of reality. As is well known, materialism is 
exclusively for them a historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of 
generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and 
its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to changed needs. Because it rests 
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on a seemingly unproductive ground (Anschauung), Feuerbach’s own take on reality is 
thereby idealistic and defective and can only therefore be abandoned. 
 
But it is not just Feuerbach who is dismissed for relying on an intuitive-contemplative 
(Anschauung) approach to materialism. As is well known, during the same period, Marx also 
dismisses Hegel’s own intuitive-contemplative approach. In the strongest of terms, Marx 
writes in “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole” that Hegel’s aim in 
The Encyclopaedia Logic is only to turn an abstract thought into a materialist one on the sole 
basis of a meaningless “feeling.” He writes:  
 
“[Hegel’s] entire transition from logic to natural philosophy is nothing else but the 
transition… from abstracting to intuiting (Anschauen). The mystical feeling which drives 
the philosopher forward from abstract thinking to intuiting is boredom—the longing for 
content.” (Marx 2007, 167). 
 
For Marx then, Hegel’s materialism is based on an empty intuition-contemplation that 
effectively serves nothing, except a bored longing for some real content. With this corollary 
condemnation of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx thus confirms his deliberations with Feuerbach 
that intuition-contemplation (Anschauung) is only a trick that allows “bourgeois” 
philosophers to claim some kind of purchase on reality, when in fact, it only serves to 
confirm their own abstract thoughts totally un-anchored in real life.  
 
Considering such condemnations, the question that inevitably begs to be asked here is this: 
What is lost and/or what is gained from this condemnation of intuition-contemplation? The 
question is obviously not: why intuition-contemplation is no longer a viable approach to 
materialism. Marx’s entire work clearly attest to the problems incurred by this exclusive 
reliance on intuition-contemplation as an abstract ground for materialism. The question is 
more precisely: what does Marxist materialism lose with such a rejection and what might it 
possibly gain if it is reconsidered it anew? If one of the declared aims of Marx’s 1845 Theses 
on Feuerbach is to come up with a type of materialism that would be able to support the 
active constitution and maintenance of the ensemble of social relations, isn’t there something 
to be said for reconsidering intuition-contemplation not as the sole approach to materialism, 
but as one of the constitutive elements of such an ensemble? In other words, can a truly 
Marxist and therefore scientific materialism made up exclusively of productive social 
relations really take place without intuition-contemplation as part of its fundamental 
constitution? These are the questions that I will attempt to address in this essay.  
 
With these questions, my aim is obviously not to rescue a Feuerbachian (or Hegelian) 
approach to materialism, but simply to analyse that intuition-contemplation is in fact an 
important element in any materialism and that, ultimately, Marx’s dismissal of it in 1845 
constitutes perhaps his most unfortunate undoing because it left praxis, as Antonio Negri and 
others have shown, caught up in the autistic machineries of capital with no way out but more 
relations of productions, more praxis.2 In other words, by dismissing Anschauung, Marx 
forestalled the promise that the relation of productions were supposed to achieve, namely the 
overthrow of capital leaving us in what effectively amounts to an endless heightened state of 
unproductive production. Without intuition-contemplation, Marx’s prized praxis indeed ends 
up locked in the vortex (or is it hell?) of a dialectical materialism that knows no way out or 
letting-go, but a constant state of exacerbated activity: materialism qua materialism with 
capital as the only driving force. This is then the aim of this essay: to show that, in the end, 
no Marxist materialism can take place without intuition-contemplation as part of its 
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fundamental structure, its very survival, and its promised deliverance. Such an ambitious—
perhaps too ambitious—aim clearly shows that my intentions with this essay are purely 
speculative and do not constitute an attempt to draw out a different—or new—interpretation 
of this famous historical turning point in the history of Marxism. 
 
In order to address these questions and fulfil this speculative aim, I will first attempt to 
rethink this pairing (intuition-contemplation) that both Marx and Engels reject by addressing 
the German word they use (and everyone else after them): Anschauung. What is it about this 
famous word of German philosophy that they find so repellent, so abhorrent? Once a 
(hopefully) clearer analysis of this word is accomplished, I will attempt to rethink it in the 
context of a Marxist approach to materialism and more specifically, to the way relations of 
production and labor take place. The field of research is here limited exclusively to a specific 
lineage of thought in the vast global Marxist scholarship on this pointy topic, namely the 
readings put forward by key French Marxists: Bloch, Henry, Althusser, Macherey, and 
Balibar. As such, it does not aim to be exhaustive of the topic or comprehensive of the 
various linguistic, philosophical, historical, political, and/or ideological approaches to the 
issue at hand.  
 
 
1. Anschauung or Intuition/Contemplation 
 
To begin with, let’s ask a first simple question: how is one to understand this word, 
Anschauung that Marx and Engels reject in 1845? The word Anschauung has a long history 
in philosophy. The word is usually first attributed to Immanuel Kant and the way he 
understands the apprehension of space and time.3 His use of the term constitutes a turning 
point in the history of philosophy in as much as Kant uses this vernacular term as a German 
translation of the Latin intuitus, thus acquiring a different connotation to that usually given to 
the word “intuition” on its own.4 In a nutshell, for Kant, space and time are not just thoughts, 
abstractions, or generalisations; they are first and foremost given in experience. However, 
space and time are not just objects of direct perception; they are also mental formations of 
these perceptions. As such, Anschauung designates a mid-point that proceeds from the state 
of being affected (Empfindung) and prepares for the last phase (Conceptualization).5 In other 
words, it functions as the transmitter between passive sense-impression and the active 
process of understanding.6 The crucial aspect of Kant’s use of the word Anschauung is the 
fact that it is not possible, strictly speaking, to ascribe this process as either belonging to the 
reality itself or to the consciousness processing the impression. The undecidability of Kant’s 
term is thus a crucial element in its continued use in philosophy.  
 
Unfortunately, as is well known, there is no equivalent word in English to translate Kant’s 
chosen term. If I limit myself to English and French versions of Kant’s works, translators 
tend to use the words “intuition,” “perception,” “apprehension,” or “contemplation,” and 
more rarely, “at-sight” (Editor 1892, 530) and “the given” (Suchting, 1986, 47). But, as is 
well known, none of these words fit the meaning of the word Anschauung solely. If I take the 
two most frequent translation (“intuition” and “contemplation”), it becomes clear that neither 
term works properly on their own: intuition already exists in German as Intuition and 
contemplation also already exists in German as Betrachtung. Furthermore, to translate 
Anschauung as “intuition” in English gives the impression that it refers to something 
inexplicable, either to some spiritual revelation or some secular lucky hunch. Kant’s word has 
neither of these connotations strictly speaking. Similarly, the problem with the second 
translation of Anschauung as “contemplation” is that it necessarily refers to the sense of sight 
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to the detriment of all other senses and as such always leads to a mental visual representation, 
thus betraying the indeterminateness of the vernacular German word. While, at first sight, the 
etymology might support this interpretation (in common usage, Anschauung means 
“viewing” and the word derives from the verb Anschauen, “to see”), the word Anschauung, at 
least in the way Kant uses it, does not necessarily imply a direct relation between the eye and 
thought.7 
 
Could there be a way of translating this word in a manner that would not rely exclusively on 
either a mystical/secular hunch or an immediate visual perception and yet keeps the 
undecidedness that was crucial to Kant and, as we will see, Feuerbach himself? Considering 
that there can never be truly satisfactory translations, I would suggest that the word be 
translated, as I have done thus far in this essay, using both connotations: as “intuition-
contemplation.” If this—admittedly, a little cumbersome—translation is acceptable, then 
Marx and Engels’s rejection of Anschauung becomes a little more problematic. On the one 
hand, the term still retains both the sense of something unknown, still “to-come,” which 
intuition refers to, and the sense of something perceptible by any one of the senses, without 
necessarily making it into an image. On the other hand, and most crucially, it also renders 
undecided the issue of whether Anschauung is an entirely passive attitude towards reality or 
whether it can also be conceived as an active element in the constitution of reality, thus 
making it into a critical component of any scientific materialism. The hope with this 
translation is therefore that it somehow retains the two characteristics of the German Kantian 
word without betraying one of them specifically.8 
 
Now that I have attempted to define the term that Marx and Engels reject and explain the use 
of the cumbersome expression intuition-contemplation for its translation, it is necessary to 
return to Marx’s own use of it in his famous Theses.9 I give here again the first thesis, as it 
constitutes the most incisive use of this term. Marx writes:  
 
“The chief defect of all hitherto-existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that 
the thing, reality, [and] sensuousness (der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit) are 
conceived only in the form of the object (Objekts) or of intuition-contemplation 
(Anschauung), but not as human sensuous activity, practice (Praxis), not subjectively.” 
(Marx 2008, 69). 
 
Marx’s three words, der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit stand for what offers itself 
to consciousness. That is, these three words stand for the “given” as it is grasped by mankind 
prior to abstraction and conceptualization. From these three words, Marx then interprets the 
way this “given” is conceived: either as “object” or through “intuition-contemplation” 
(Anschauung). How is one to make sense of this double rejection? 
 
Marx’s alternative between “object” and “intuition-contemplation” is simply an attempt to 
highlight two misguided approaches to materialism. The first one takes the “given” as an 
object of understanding and not for what it “is.” The second one takes this “given” through an 
immediate and sensual apprehension devoid of objectification. The fallacy that Marx 
highlights here is that this “given” cannot be apprehended through either of these approaches 
alone. It must be approached, as the first thesis shows, as praxis, that is, as an active 
undertaking or, as he says, as a “human sensuous activity” (sinnlich menschliche).10 What is 
crucial in this first thesis is that Marx doesn’t exactly reject the previous two approaches, he 
simply shows that alone they are insufficient. There cannot be a purely objectifying relation 
to the “given” and there cannot be a purely fusional and ecstatic rapport to it, called 
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“intuitive-contemplative.” Only through a predominantly11 active approach to this “given” 
can materialism take off.  
 
But what exactly do Marx and Engels privilege instead exactly? How is one to understand 
this “human activity or praxis” in the way it was formulated in 1845? The answer, I think, is 
simple: Marx and Engels reject first “object” because it is too abstract and detached and 
second, “intuition-contemplation,” because it is essentially passive. Neither of these 
approaches represents activity as such and therefore the true revolutionary process of 
materialism. For them, the proper way to apprehend reality is through its active processes, the 
way the subject and the object interact with each other and no objectification or passive 
intuition-contemplation can ever render this singlehandedly. As Ernst Bloch explains: “the 
earlier materialism… lacked that permanently oscillating subject-object relationship which is 
known as labor. For this reason, Feuerbach still interpreted things, reality, and sensuous 
materiality ‘in the form of objects’ and apart from ‘sensuous human activity’.” (Bloch 1971, 
67). The old German and “bourgeois” approach to reality, including that of Feuerbach, is 
therefore devoid of history, alien to the subject-object relationship, and therefore 
unrepresentative of praxis properly speaking. This leads Bloch to conclude: “Feuerbach … 
view[ed] the object in an antiquated ‘aristocratic’ way… He looked down at action from his 
lofty position, and saw it only as a sordid undertaking.” (Bloch 1971, 72). Marx and Engels’ 
privileging of human activity or praxis is therefore an attempt to foreground a real subject-
object relation as the principal constitution of reality and thus put forward the true and only 
construction of history, the result of the product of labor.  
 
Can there be another way of going about it? In order to see whether Anschauung can be 
understood differently than as a useless passive process and to evaluate its importance within 
the context of a “scientific” approach to materialism, it is necessary to explore further this 
term, and especially the way it is interpreted by two of Marx’s most astute commentators: 
Etienne Balibar and Michel Henry. Let’s start with Balibar.  
 
 
2. Praxis, Poiesis, Theoria and the Imperative of Action  
 
Balibar explains Marx’s dismissal of the word Anschauung by referencing the trio: praxis, 
poiesis, theoria. For him, Marx opens-up a new way of understanding this trio, one which 
excludes Anschauung precisely because of its passive connotation. He begins by examining 
Marx’s use of the first two terms (praxis, poiesis). Since the Greeks, praxis is basically free 
action in which man realizes and transforms himself, eventually seeking to attain his own 
perfection. As for poiesis (from the verb poiein: to make), it is basically necessary action, 
subject to all the constraints of the relationship with nature, that is, with its material 
conditions. The perfection it seeks is not that of man, but of things, products for use. Here, 
then, is the first aspect of Marx's new materialism: not a mere inversion of the hierarchy—i.e. 
a primacy accorded to poiesis over praxis by virtue of its direct relationship with matter—but 
the identification of the two, or as Balibar says, “the revolutionary thesis that praxis 
constantly passes over into poiesis and vice versa…” (Balibar 2017, 41). 
 
Balibar then explains that Marx uses the third term (theoria), not in the old sense of a mental 
scheme, but in a new sense, that is, as an active philosophical practice evacuated of all forms 
of passivity. He writes: 
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“Now, such a thesis cannot but affect the third term of the classical triptych: theoria or 
‘theory’… As a counterpart to the ‘practice = production’ equation established there, The 
German Ideology makes a decisive sideways move: it identifies theoria with a ‘production 
of consciousness’; or, more precisely, with one of the terms of the historical contradiction 
to which the production of consciousness gives rise. That term is, in fact, ideology, Marx’s 
second innovation of 1845, by way of which he was, as it were, proposing to philosophy 
that it view itself in the mirror of practice.” (Balibar 2017, 41). 
 
The third element in the classical trio, theoria, is thus no longer understood as a 
contemplative intellectual undertaking close to Anschauung, but as a mirror of activity itself, 
the effective production of consciousness. If one follows Balibar, it then becomes clear that 
with Marx, theoria has effectively been evacuated of its contemplative dimension, making it 
the third element of a purely active undertaking: free (praxis), necessary (poiesis), and 
conscious (theoria). The old expression of German speculative philosophy, Anschauung, can 
only therefore be rejected because it is essentially antithetic to the new active trio proposed 
by Marx. Basically, in an all-active apprehension of “the given,” Anschauung must once 
again be cast aside. 
 
Let’s now move to Michel Henry. Henry takes a slightly different view to the problem. 
Instead of focusing, like Balibar, on the trio praxis, poiesis, theoria and claiming them as 
exclusively active, he directly focuses on Feuerbach’s term, Anschauung so as to make sense 
of what Marx rejects. Without questioning at any point the translation of Anschauung into the 
French intuition, Henry asks himself, “so what is this intuition?” By way of an answer, Henry 
returns, once again, to the classic apprehension of intuition as a form of unveiling or 
revelation. For him, intuition does not create beings; it reveals being itself. As he says, 
“intuition has this ultimate phenomenological meaning: it is this and no more than this. It 
unveils beings, it is this unveiling as such.” (Henry 1983, 131). When, later-on, in the same 
text, Henry asks himself why Marx rejects so categorically this “unveiling” intuition, he 
explains, in no uncertain terms, that it is because, in the end, intuition is incapable of 
displaying in itself “the being of action.” He writes: “Acting is not intuiting, it is not seeing, it 
is not looking. In as much as intuition takes place, in as much as we live in it, in as much as 
we ‘intuit,’ we are not acting.” (Henry 1983, 142). The contrast between action and intuition 
could not, once again, be clearer: intuition-contemplation (Anschauung) is most simply 
everything that Marxist materialism should not be. No action, properly conceived within a 
scientific materialist framework, needs this old term of German idealist philosophy.  
 
But Henry realises that this cannot be so simple. He also notes that in some instances, it is 
possible that action takes place at the same time as intuition-contemplation. For example, we 
can contemplate what we are doing as a way of assuring ourselves that our action is indeed 
going in the general direction of the goal we are pursuing. Intuition-contemplation is 
therefore a way of correcting or surveying the action. In this context, Anschauung might not 
be as useless after all. But this is not to be. Very quickly, he writes, as if catching himself off-
guard that the two, in the end, must be distinguished:  
 
“However, action, considered in itself has nothing to do with this gaze of intuition with the 
discovery of a spectacle with the appearing of an object. Discovering a spectacle, 
contemplating it, living in the presence of an object is, precisely, not acting.” (Henry 1983, 
142-3). 
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Intuition-contemplation cannot therefore be understood in any active sense, not even as that 
of directing or controlling the activity underway. Activity or praxis understood in a purely 
Marxist sense, must be, once more, devoid of any contemplative intuiting and this simply 
because, as Henry says, that is how we really act in our lives: “without having the intuition of 
our action… without looking at it, without giving it to ourselves as an object.” (Henry 1983, 
143). Crucially, Henry concludes his analyses of the problem of intuition in relation to 
materialism by saying that if one gets rid of intuition-contemplation, then praxis effectively 
comes to the fore. The rejection is in fact necessary; it constitutes the fundamental tenet of 
dialectical materialism. Action is indeed only possible if it is not intuition because the essence 
(or being) of action is, in the end, totally foreign to that of intuition. In this way, in order to 
move on from an idealist approach to materialism that generates a living reality petrified by 
the gaze, it is therefore necessary to give action all its due, that is, to allow it to just “act.”12 
 
The question that inevitably should be asked here in response to both Balibar and Henry’s 
reading of Marx’s “intuitive-free” materialism of 1845 is this: what if one understood 
Anschauung or intuition-contemplation in a way whereby it is not exclusively passive, but 
active-passive as Kant intimated it initially? This question is not intended to go against Marx, 
Balibar, or Henry and say that their readings are erroneous; but to raise instead the possibility 
that a) there might not be anything inherently passive about intuition-contemplation or 
Anschauung and b) that materialism could actively do something with this discarded term of 
early materialisms without at any one point betraying Marx’s sought-after scientific 
materialism. To address this, I will return not to Kant, but to Feuerbach himself, the main 
target of Marx and Engels’ criticisms. The aim for this return is to allow this rather neglected 
figure of German philosophy to have a say in this debate that fatally castigated him to the 
dustbin of history while he was just turning 40.13  
 
 
3. Feuerbach’s Praxis 
 
Returning to Feuerbach after the monumental undertakings of Marx is always difficult not 
only because his work often leads to misreadings and misunderstandings, but also because it 
is often viewed in a negative Marxist angle, as the half-way proponent between an idealist 
philosophy and a truly materialist project. And yet, once both this negative outlook and the 
rather complex nature of his writing is overcome, Feuerbach manages to reveal some rather 
astute insights into the problems that Marx and Engels were addressing mid-nineteenth 
century. If one focuses exclusively on their use of Anschauung, it becomes clear, for 
example, that Marx’s blanket condemnation is probably not as justified as he thinks and that 
Engel’s vitriolic copy-cat rejection of all things Feuerbachian reveals how little he 
understood of his work. Let’s explore Feuerbach’s approach to the issue of the apprehension 
of reality through the prism of Anschauung and thus his own idiosyncratic conception of 
materialism.  
 
Firstly, contrary to what Engels thinks, Feuerbach does not pitch activity and passivity 
against one another and he does not place subject-object relations against intuition-
contemplation. When it comes to Anschauung, Feuerbach always starts by simply pitching it 
against thought. Thought stands for objectification and intuition-contemplation stands for a 
letting go of this objectification. He writes in the twenty-fifth Principles of the Philosophy of 
the Future:14  
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“In thought, I am an absolute subject; I let everything exist only as my object or predicate; 
that is, as object or predicate of myself as a thinking being. I am intolerant. In relation to 
the activity of my senses, such as intuition-contemplation (Anschauung), I am, on the 
other hand, a liberal; I let the object be what I myself am—a subject, a real and self-
activating being.” (Feuerbach 1986, 40, translation modified). 
 
As this extract shows, contrary to thought, which only serves as possessing objects and 
rendering us intolerant, Anschauung does something positive: it allows the person intuiting-
contemplating to become a subject. In other words, intuition-contemplation, this letting go of 
objectification, allows us to be self-activating subjects.15 Anschauung is thereby an 
empowering process that is neither passive nor possessive and aims ultimately to curb the 
excesses of thought and objectification, thus avoiding taking oneself (and others) as object(s).  
 
In his Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy, written during the same period, 
Feuerbach further confirms this dual role of thought and intuition-contemplation, the former 
being a mediating and objectifying process, the latter being an unmediated access to 
subjectivity. He writes: 
 
“Thought is the principle governing school and all systems. Intuition (Anschauung) is the 
principle of life. In intuition, I am at the mercy of the object, in thought I determine the 
object. In thought, I am ‘me,’ in intuition, I am ‘non-me’… Intuition gives the unmediated 
essence of existence as one, thought gives the mediated essence of existence as 
distinction.” (Feuerbach 1972, 120-1, my translation into English).16 
 
Once again, Feuerbach clearly brings together both thought and intuition without giving 
priority to one or the other. The two have clearly specific roles in the apprehension of reality. 
Feuerbach further explains this dual role in his Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, 
again when he writes in principle forty-eight: “Thought does not follow a straight line within 
its self-identity, but is always interrupted by sensuous intuition (Anschauung).” (Feuerbach 
1986, 64). In other words, thought cannot effectively take place independently of intuition-
contemplation: it needs it to carry out its objectifying tasks. But why should this matter? 
Because, for Feuerbach, without intuition-contemplation, thought effectively only leads to 
itself, it only operates in complete circularity, and such autism never manages, in the end, to 
access reality. In order to have a proper access to reality, in order to avoid the dangers of a 
system locked in the circularity of thought, it is necessary to have something radically alien 
to thought: intuition-contemplation. 
 
So this is what Anschauung is for: it not only gives the possibility of thought, it also and 
above all gives access to reality, including being itself. Without the intertwinement of the 
two, reality cannot be accessed, materialism cannot move, production and labor remain in 
deadlock, always pointing back to itself. Feuerbach summarises his approach to the twin 
issue of thought/intuition-contemplation: 
 
“Sensuous intuition (Anschauung) takes things in a broad sense, but thought takes them in 
the narrowest sense; intuition leaves things in their unlimited freedom, but thought 
imposes on them laws that are only too often despotic; intuition introduces clarity into the 
head, but without determining or deciding anything; thought performs a determining 
function, but it also often makes the mind narrow; intuition in itself has no principles and 
thought in itself has no life; the rule is the way of thought and exception to the rule is that 
of intuition.” (Feuerbach 1986, 65). 
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So intuition-contemplation is really not the only way Feuerbach accesses reality and it does 
not found, contra Marx, his materialism exclusively. There cannot be reality without both 
thought and intuition-contemplation and it is the two, taken together, that are the active-
passive agents giving us the materiality of the world. As he writes, again in the Principles of 
the Philosophy of the Future: 
 
“The thought that is identical, and exists in an uninterrupted continuity, with itself, lets the 
world circle, in contradiction to reality, around itself as its center; but the thought that is 
interrupted through … the anomaly of intuition (Anschauung), transforms this circular 
movement into an elliptical one in accordance with the truth.” (Feuerbach 1986, 65). 
 
Such an approach to reality gives us a type of philosophy that cannot therefore be confined 
exclusively, as Marx and others imagined, to a type of passive project, the aristocratic gazing 
of the world from above, untainted by the objectifying modes of production. On the contrary, 
Feuerbach’s philosophy is one that identifies Anschauung and thought as the two components 
structuring not only praxis, but also poiesis and theoria. Feuerbach’s materialist project is 
indeed one that neither reduces everything to “pure action” (Balibar) nor ejects “passive” 
intuition as the real obstacle to the being of action (Henry), but intertwines both object 
(thought) and intuition-contemplation (Anschauung) to apprehend, as Marx desperately 
wants, “the thing, reality, [and] sensuousness (der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, 
Sinnlichkeit).” 
 
 
Conclusion: Anschauung and Marx’s ensemble 
 
What does this return to Feuerbach’s thinking allows us to do, now, nearly 135 years after 
Marx’s passing? What kind of consequences does this attempt to re-think the word 
Anschauung that Marx, Engels, Althusser, Henry, and Balibar reject with such force, allows 
us to accomplish? Can one re-think the intuitive-contemplative—and thereby supposedly, 
feminine17—approach that Feuerbach is seen to impose on reality and recast it within the 
context of Marx’s 1845 new materialism? In order to evaluate the type of consequences that 
might be inferred from such a change in the meaning of the word Anschauung, it is necessary 
to reconsider Marx’s crucial sixth thesis on Feuerbach. He writes: 
 
“Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man (menschliche Wesen = 
‘human nature’). But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual. In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.” (Marx 2008, 71). 
 
As has been commented many times, this famous thesis attempts to designate the importance 
of the displacement that is needed between an understanding of man as a single abstract 
monad and as an ensemble of real social relations.18 The shift from singularity to multiplicity 
forces philosophy to move from the reified realm of abstraction that has characterised it to 
date, into a materialist approach to reality that leaves no space for idealism (“in reality” – “In 
seiner Wirklichkeit”), thus opening up a truly revolutionary work that Marx envisaged as to-
come. In other words, with this famous thesis, there can be no more (in-)finite abstract supra-
entities, such as Being or Spirit lording over or structuring reality, but a concert of concrete 
social relations, the true modus-operandi of the new materialism of the future.19  
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However, while the move from abstraction-singularity to materialism-multiplicity is an 
undeniable key change in Marx’s thought,20 one must not forget that the ensemble he 
suggests as an alternative to idealist materialism is effectively never fixed; it is always in 
movement.21 In other words, the ensemble of social relations is always in a permanent state of 
restructuration (Selbstveränderung). Marx uses this expression three theses earlier:  
 
“The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change 
(Selbstveränderung) can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionising 
practice.” (Marx 2008, 70). 
 
What this previous thesis shows is that in order for social relations to be essentially 
“revolutionary,” or “unwälzende” as Engels suggests in his own editorial intervention to the 
same thesis, it needs to be always already open to the contingent, to what is unknown, to 
what irremediably alters the ensemble into something hereto unheard off or unrecognizable, a 
new ensemble, for example. The self-restructuration of the ensemble is thus crucial to fight 
back the inevitable ossifications—mostly conceptual, but also political and ideological—that 
always threatens it. 
 
Such openness to the contingent (or to what is “to-come,” to use Derrida’s vocabulary22) is 
usually interpreted as the main motor of revolutionary Marxism, namely, it opens-up to the 
teleological future that it promises. This is what leads Ernest Bloch to affirm that the 
ensemble and therefore reality is indeed always changeable (“veränderbar”), something 
which neither classical materialism nor idealism ever admitted.23 Similarly, Louis Althusser 
equally affirms the importance of understanding Marx’s 1845 ensemble as a theory that must 
always already be understood as “an action to be achieved, a displacement to be put in 
effect… The real, this way!” (Althusser 2005, 210). Finally, this is what Balibar also 
remarks, in his own analyses of this particular thesis when he says that the indefinite 
character of Marx’s French word ensemble needs to be understood as essentially “open to 
infinity.” (Balibar 2012, 11). But how does the self-change (Selbstveränderung) of the 
ensemble take place? How does this openness to the contingent or what is to-come occur? 
What gives “the way” to the real? How does infinity open-up?  
 
This is where Feuerbach’s own interpretation of Anschauung becomes crucial. In order to 
make sense of the movement implied in Marx’s Selbstveränderung, I feel it is necessary to 
rethink the ensemble as essentially structured by both rational thought and intuitive-
contemplation. If one indeed keeps in mind our re-reading of this much maligned 
Feuerbachian term, then the revolutionary ensemble that Marx proposes must also take into 
account, not only subject-object relations, that is, the modes of productions and labor, but 
also all that which, always already escapes them and this includes the intuitions-
contemplations that structure them. If Feuerbach is right in believing that no rational thought, 
and therefore no labor relation can take place without intuition-contemplation, then Marx’s 
ensemble cannot truly function without it, not as a foundational empty abstraction à la Hegel, 
but, most simply, as a key constitutive element of the ensemble. The ensemble needs 
Anschauung to keep this permanent state of restructuration (Selbstveränderung) that prevents 
it from ossifying into relations of productions for their own sake, that is, into a revolution that 
knows no resolution in sight. In other words, the displacement that is offered here with 
Feuerbach’s own interpretation of this word is that the ensemble is no longer just structured 
by history, it is also structured by what surprises it, that is, by what interrupts its very process 
every second of time and says, intuitively, “this way!” There can be no new ensemble without 
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it. It stands for one of the motors in the self-change of the production of material existence; 
its very opening onto infinity. 
 
In this way, once Marx’s condemnation of intuition-contemplation is rethought in a sense that 
is neither passive nor absolute, but undecidedly active and passive at once, we can then 
finally move, as his last thesis (eleven) famously suggests, from a philosophy that only seeks 
to interpret the world to one that truly seeks to change it. But this time, it will no longer be a 
revolution against an old philosophy, that is, pure action against aristocratic contemplation, 
but a revolution that seeks to empower the ensemble both as action for change and as 
intuition-contemplation for change, a dual gesture that concerns not just modes of production 
or forms of labor, but also the activity-passivity of self-restructuration of the ensemble itself. 
When this will materialise itself, the ensemble will then truly reflect what it is made up: 
humans that are able to put forward a rational thought and interrupt it altogether, tackle the 
real and intuit it at the same time, participate in production and labor without fossilizing them 
in conceptual oppressions, and create use-values without also assuming them to be 
exclusively and necessarily exchange-values. It is only then that the Marxist materialist 
revolution intimated in 1845 will acquire, beyond Capital, its fulfilling dimension, one in 
which it recognizes each component of the ensemble as made up of humans who don’t just 
make history, but invent and surprise it too, each and every one of them in modes hereto 
unheard off. After all, growth, however it is understood, is driven not by productivity alone, 
but above all by knowledge at the cusp of reason. 
 
Can this foster a new name and therefore a new horizon for Marx’s praxis? If “the given” 
(der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit) is no longer understood predominantly 
through activity, that is, as praxis-poiesis-theoria, but above all through the activity-passivity 
that allows the ensemble to re-structure itself every second of time (rational thought + 
intuition-contemplation), should it then not foster a different appellation, a new term for the 
future? In a surprising reading of Heidegger’s work, Jean-Luc Nancy translates, at one point 
in his analyses, the Greek term praxis by “to conduct oneself” (se conduire), thus 
emphasizing through its etymology (from the Latin verb conducere, “bringing together”) the 
social mode of any praxis.24 If Marx’s primary emphasis is indeed praxis, and therefore 
subject-object relations and if, on our account, these relations must be understood with the 
added benefit of intuition-contemplation (Anschauung), do we then not have here an 
invitation to “conduct oneself” over and beyond the simple call for more active praxis, 
poiesis, and theoria? In other words, to form an ensemble, to be part of such an ensemble, one 
must effectively not just “act,” but also and above all, “conduct oneself” and that implies a 
certain amount of intuition-contemplation, Anschauung. The future of any ensemble is 
therefore not an apocalypse or a communist ideal imagined on the horizon and arrived at by 
mere productive toiling alone, but most simply the recurrent call to “conduct ourselves” so 
that the said ensemble continues to maintain itself forever in its very own self-restructuration 
(Selbstveränderung). 
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Notes
                                                
1 On this topic, see Macherey 2008, 131-2. 
2 There is, unfortunately, no space here to unpack this well-known argument that sees 1917-
1929 as a crucial turning point in history in which Marxism floundered because instead of the 
overthrow of capital liberating its productive potential, these crises led in fact to the self-
destruction of that very potential. See Negri 1988. 
3 With such a statement, I deliberately circumscribe the issue of Anschauung to only reflect 
pure intuition (i.e. intuition that cannot be inferred or explained a posteriori). In doing so, I 
therefore bypass the much larger issue of intuitions as they are analyzed in the fields of 
linguistic or behaviorist theories. For Kant’s pure intuition, see Kant 1993, especially, 
A19/B77. 
4 And, therefore, to the interpretation of intuition given by Descartes, namely, as a type of 
self-evident knowledge gained through rational—but not-deductive—reasoning. See 
Descartes 1997.  
5 As is well known, Henri Bergson famously inverts this interpretation when he says that 
intuition—and not Anschauung—is not something that reveals itself to consciousness, but is 
the act of entering it and in doing so, “seizing ourselves from within.” There is, 
unfortunately, no space here to analyse these post-Marxist differences. See Bergson 2002. 
6 The word is also, obviously, picked up by many other philosophers all the way up to the 
twentieth-first century. Besides the two authors that concerns us here directly, namely 
Feuerbach and Marx, it is worth noting that the word obviously receives its most significant 
development with Edmund Husserl. Husserl pushes Kant’s understanding of this term in 
altogether different direction. Instead of making it a mid-way between sense-data and mental 
constructions, he sees it as the medium in which reality impinges on one’s consciousness. In 
order to show this, Husserl re-emphasizes the distinction between the German vernacular 
Kantian term, Anschauung and the Latin intuitio. Unlike Kant, Husserl uses the former 
primarily as an analogical extension of shauen, that is, seeing in the sense of immediate 
visual awareness of reality, thus retaining the primacy of visuality, close to eidetic “seeing” 
(Wesensschau), Ideas I, §19. He uses the latter primarily as a transcendental determination of 
the essence of things, thus detaching it from any specific visual reference. There is, 
unfortunately, no space here to analyse these post-Marxist distinctions. See Husserl 1983. For 
an analysis of Husserl’s use of these terms, see Levinas 1973 and Hintikka 2003. 
7 As Georges Labica says, “Taken at its most familiar and literal sense, Anschauung means… 
simply perception without specifying a particular type of perception.” Labica 2014, 38, my 
translation. 
8 Unfortunately, there is no space here to make a crucial comparison between this 
interpretation of Anschauung and Spinoza’s third type of knowledge (intuition) which he 
develops, against Descartes, in the Scholia of Proposition XXIX of his Ethics. In a nutshell, 
Spinoza argues that his third type of knowledge takes place at the edge of time, both sub 
duratione (from the premise of a spatial and temporal perspective) and sub-species eternitatis 
(from non-spatial and temporal premises). To illustrate this point, Spinoza, as is well known, 
uses the example of a circle existing in space and time. Inside it, necessary, but invisible 
intersecting chords form equally necessary, but invisible rectangles. Unlike the circle, the 
chords and rectangles don’t actually exist in space and time. They are dependent on the circle 
to exist, but “are” not “there,” properly speaking. Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge is 
therefore not a process that singlehandedly touches upon an elsewhere, but operates at the 
indecision of what is in and out of space and time. As such, Spinoza’s vision therefore 
involves both an adequate set of ideas about the properties of things (i.e. knowledge of the 
second kind, in Spinoza’s taxonomy) and one that defies all forms of rationality (i.e. 
 14 
                                                                                                                                                  
knowledge of the third kind, intuition). See Spinoza 1992. For an analysis of Spinoza’s 
understanding of intuition, see, amongst others, Soyarslan 2013. For a comparison between 
Spinoza and Feuerbach, see Bensussan 2008 and for insightful comparisons between Spinoza 
and Marx, see amongst a vast literature: Negri 1991, Holland 1998, Fischbach 2005, Tosel 
2008. 
9 For an analysis of Marx’s Theses in English, see Suchting 1979 and 1986. Although I don’t 
agree with his analyses of the Theses, mainly because he translates Anschauung with “the 
given,” thus missing out on an important aspect of Marx’s critique, Suchting’s studies 
constitute excellent introductions to these early works in English. 
10 I leave aside here, for lack of space, the enormous issue of sensuousness and its 
relationship to reality and materialism. 
11 I use this word in order to emphasize that Marx does not intend, as is well known, pure 
action as such or actus purus in the idealist manner of Moses Hess or Karl Grün. 
12 The problem with the rest of Henry’s commentary is that he then moves on, contrary to 
Marx, to conflate both object and intuition as well as intuition and seeing as if these were all 
interchangeable or synonymous. Firstly, Marx clearly writes in Thesis One, “object or 
intuition” (Objekts oder der Anschauung). There is no amalgamation of the theoretical 
process of objectification and that of intuition, but a clear alternative. Secondly, Marx never 
confuses intuition with seeing exclusively. As the ambivalent use of the word Anschauung 
shows, intuition is not necessarily contemplation. For the way Henry finishes his argument 
conflating all these terms, see Henry 1983, 145 and again, 153-7. 
13 On this history, see Chamberlain 1941, Kamenka 1970, Wartofsky 1977, and Dellaï 2011. 
14 Taken as a whole, most of Feuerbach’s analyses of the term Anschauung—at least, in the 
crucial period prior to the 1848 revolution—can be found in his Principles of the Philosophy 
of the Future. His most well-known book, The Essence of Christianity, only contains nine 
separate occurrences of the word Anschauung. There is clearly an evolution between The 
Essence and The Principles showing Feuerbach’s attempt to explain his position with regards 
to this crucial word of German philosophy. See Feuerbach 2008. 
15 There is unfortunately no space here to compare this Feuerbachian idea with Fichte’s 
Thathandlung, which also intertwines thought and intuition. Suffice to say that while Fichte’s 
leads to transcendental subjectivist idealism, Feuerbach’s leads instead to social materialism. 
See Fichte 1994, especially 47-9. 
16 I give this translation instead of the one found in English for the simple reason that it is 
more representative of Feuerbach’s overall thought. Here is Lawrence S. Stepelevich 
translation: “Thinking is the principle of the school, of the system; intuition, the principle of 
life. In intuition, I am determined by an object, in thinking I determine the object. In thinking, 
I am an ‘I,’ in intuition a ‘not-I.’ … The intuition yields simply the essence immediately 
identical with existence. Thinking yields the essence mediated by its distinction and its 
separation from existence.” (Stepelevich 1983, 164). 
17 Unfortunately, there is no space here to explore this problematic analogy. Bloch is the only 
author who makes this comparison between passive intuition-contemplation and the 
feminine, albeit without realizing the problems that such a comparison entails. He indeed 
writes without hesitation that “Feuerbach effeminizes humanity.” (Bloch 1971, 86). While 
the Feuerbachian reading proposed in this essay may suggest that issues of gender have been 
subsumed under a generic (and therefore male) characteristic of human relations (“we” all 
intuit/reason), the sought-after renewal of Marx’s ensemble it ultimately aims to achieve 
should be seen, on the contrary, as a mandate to study the role and participation of all gender 
and gender identifications in their own oppressions, their engagement in social relations, their 
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need for self-change and their subjection as part of the ensemble. For a rare attempt to read 
Marx’s 1845 Theses through the lens of gender, see Haug 2015. 
18 Thus, echoing, as has been commented a few times before, Feuerbach’s own understanding 
of being: “Sein ist Gemeinschaft,” Being is community. (Feuerbach 1980, 122). 
19 Which Marx will later formulate with expressions such as: “The human being is 
in the most literal sense a Zoon politikon not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which 
can individuate itself only in the midst of society.” Marx 1993, 84. 
20 A move, let us hasten to emphasize, made way before Heidegger’s complex analyses of 
mit-dasein and of its many avatars including Nancy’s being-singular-plural. See amongst 
others, Nancy 1992.  
21 For an interpretation of the Sixth Thesis that evinces this contingent movement in order to 
recuperate a supposedly totalising sense to human nature in Marx, see the very thorough 
Geras 1983. For Marx’s concept of man, see Fromm 2003, 1-70. 
22 See Derrida 1994. 
23 See Bloch 1986, 249-86. 
24 See Nancy 1999. 
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